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Abstract
Using consistent agent-based techniques, this research explores the welfare consequences of
product diﬀerentiation on congested networks. The economic analysis focuses on the source,
evolution, measurement, and impact of product diﬀerentiation with heterogeneous users on a
mixed ownership network. Path diﬀerentiation and space diﬀerentiation are deﬁned and
measured for a base scenario and several variants. The ﬁndings favour a ﬁxed-rate road
pricing policy compared to complete pricing freedom on toll roads. It is also shown that
the impact of production diﬀerentiation on welfare is not always positive and depends on
the level of user heterogeneity.
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In markets with heterogeneous users who have a distinct preference and
willingness to pay, ﬁrms often achieve their welfare or revenue objectives
by supplying a diﬀerentiated quality of products or services associated
with diﬀerentiated prices. This product diﬀerentiation is seen in the
operations of airlines and passenger railways, where users are allowed to
pay a premium to receive better service in a ﬁrst-class cabin. If we deﬁne
all variable monetary costs that users pay for transportation services as
the price, and travel time as the measure of service level on a road network,
product diﬀerentiation does not exist under the standard Wardrop’s user
equilibrium without tolls, which states that all used routes between an
origin–destination pair have the same lowest travel time. Due to welfare
and/or revenue considerations, public and private road authorities may
impose tolls on users of certain facilities, creating price diﬀerences on
alternative routes serving the same origin–destination pair. As users
adjust their travel decisions in response to the price discrepancy, the
network can exhibit lower levels of congestion on tolled routes and
higher levels of congestion on untolled routes, giving rise to product diﬀer-
entiation. Over time, capacity choices by facility providers also aﬀect the
level of service both directly, by mitigating congestion, and indirectly, by
inﬂuencing future pricing decisions.
Transportation economists have long promoted welfare-maximising
marginal-cost tolls on roads, and various other road-pricing schemes
under second-best conditions (for example, in cases when not all roads
can be tolled, or when there exist cross-subsidies between modes). Politi-
cians may favour road pricing for its revenue-generating and congestion-
mitigating potentials. The emergence of private roads has introduced
proﬁt-maximising objectives into road-pricing analysis. Few researchers
consider price and capacity choices simultaneously, and none considers
those choices on general networks with complex substitutional and com-
plementary eﬀects. Product diﬀerentiation and user heterogeneity are
recognised as important factors in the welfare analysis of road-pricing
policies. However, proper measures of product diﬀerentiation on road
networks remain largely unavailable to researchers.
This paper models the toll and capacity choices on general transpor-
tation networks with complete user heterogeneity, and the subsequent
emergence of product diﬀerentiation. The overall and distributional eﬀects
of product diﬀerentiation are analysed for several system scenarios. The
modelling methodology in this paper represents a signiﬁcant departure
from the previous literature in transportation economics that has relied
primarily on equilibrium analysis on stylised networks. An evolutionary
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dual decision-makers over time. Users make decisions regarding trip
frequencies, destinations, and routes, and continuously adjust these
decisions according to their heterogeneous preferences, values of time,
and the pricing/capacity decisions by road authorities. Given an initial
system state and carefully calibrated parameters, the transportation
network in the model evolves into a speciﬁc pattern, replicating the central
tendency of real-world network changes over time. This agent-based
approach is applicable to large real-world transportation networks, and
is demonstrated in this paper on a revised Sioux Falls network with both
tolled and untolled roads.
2.0 Literature Review
Theoretical studies about road pricing have a long history (Dupuit, 1844;
Pigou, 1920; Knight, 1924; Mohring and Harwitz, 1962; Vickery, 1963;
Walters, 1968; Small, 1992; Arnott et al., 1993; Button and Verhoef,
1998; Gomez-Ibanez, 1999; Liu and McDonald, 1999; de Palma and
Lindsey, 2002; Verhoef, 2002; Levinson, 2005; Zou and Levinson, 2006).
Research in this ﬁeld has advanced from ﬁrst-best to various second-best
pricing schemes, from time-independent to time-varying tolls, from
assumptions of user homogeneity to heterogeneity, and from assumptions
of a centralised system operator to various ownership regimes. The
majority of previous literature on road pricing (second-based congestion
pricing, in particular) is based on a small parallel network; few studies
examine price competition on a serial network (Levinson, 1999, 2000; De
Borger et al., 2006). The use of small stylised networks for transportation
economics analysis allows researchers to focus on the welfare consequences
of alternative policies. Verhoef (2002) develops an algorithm to identify toll
points and second-best tolls on a general network.
While pricing policies are typically proposed with the goal of improving
short-run network eﬃciency, studies on investment principles are generally
concerned with long-run eﬃciency assuming a priori the pricing policy
(Wohl and Hendrickson, 1984). Previous research on the network design
problem (NDP) seeks to ﬁnd the optimal network that serves a certain
travel demand, or the optimal network enhancement given a budget
constraint (Boyce et al., 1974; LeBlanc, 1975; Poorzahedy and Turnquist,
1982; Yang and Bell, 1998; Meng et al., 2001). Game theoretical
approaches have also found their way into road pricing and investment
analysis, with the clear advantage of explicitly considering individual
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437players, their strategies, and interactions (Hollander and Prashker, 2006).
Beneﬁt–cost analysis has been extensively used in practice for strategic
investment planning.
Few studies consider price competition and capacity choices together.
Keeler and Small (1977) develop a theoretical model to examine optimal
peak-load pricing and investment on urban expressways. Verhoef and
Rouwendal (2004) recently revisited this topic with additional considera-
tions of second-best pricing policies. Zhang and Levinson (2006) consider
pricing, investment, and ownership dynamics simultaneously. Although
the beneﬁts of jointly considering price and capacity competition are
obvious as they clearly inﬂuence each other, these studies show that the
associated modelling eﬀorts also increase signiﬁcantly.
Assuming away user heterogeneity and the possibility of product diﬀer-
entiation could cause the beneﬁt of road pricing to be underestimated, as
shown by several previous studies (Arnott et al., 1992; de Palma, 1992;
Schmanske, 1993; Small and Yan, 2001; Verhoef and Small, 2004). It has
been shown that with heterogeneity (for example, diﬀerent values of
time), a single toll is inferior to diﬀerentiated tolls on two parallel roads.
Verhoef and Small (2004) base their analysis on a continuous value-of-
timedistributionandathree-linkparallel-serialnetwork,whileearlierstudies
are often conducted for the two-link parallel network with discretised
value-of-time distributions. Anderson et al. (1992) systematically consider
production diﬀerentiation in the transportation system with discrete
choice models.
3.0 The Agent-Based Model: User Choices
In order to explore product diﬀerentiation on congested networks with
heterogeneous users, the proposed agent-based approach requires the
development of several component models, considering user choices
(demand model), pricing choices, and capacity choices, respectively. This
section describes the demand model and user choices regarding trip
frequencies, destinations, and routes. Section 4 presents the models of
pricing and capacity choices by public and private road authorities,
followed by the analysis of production diﬀerentiation in subsequent
sections.
3.1 Overview of the demand model
Trip frequency choices, and to some extent destination choices, are often
represented by OD-speciﬁc predeﬁned (inverse) demand functions in
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assignment principles. On a complex network, this approach may become
problematic, as there are substitutional eﬀects between destinations and
the OD-speciﬁc demand functions are interdependent and no longer separ-
able. The concept of ‘generalised travel cost’ allows the consideration of toll
and travel time in traﬃc assignment, but does not provide an algorithm that
assigns heterogeneous users with distinct values of time to alternative
routes. Building on a previously developed agent-based approach for
travel demand analysis (Zhang and Levinson, 2004), we develop a more
advanced demand model in this paper that considers trips frequency, desti-
nation, and route choices by heterogeneous users. The term ‘agent-based’
implies that decision-makers have individual behavioural rules, possess
learning capabilities, interact with each other, and adjust their behaviours
adaptively over time.
There are several main assumptions in the proposed model. First of all,
residential locations of all users are assumed to be ﬁxed for simplicity and
there are no land use changes. This may result in prediction biases, espe-
cially when the model is applied to produce long-term estimates due to
the well-known land use–transportation interactions. This ﬁxed land use,
and therefore ﬁxed overall travel demand, allows the model to achieve a
long-term system equilibrium more easily. However, future research on
long-term transportation network dynamics should strive to relax this
assumption and use integrated land use–transportation models. Over a
long period of time, the impact of transportation investments on land use
could be signiﬁcant. Any land-use changes will in turn inﬂuence subsequent
transportationnetwork dynamics.Each traveller in themodel is assumed to
have a predetermined travel budget, which is a simpliﬁed representation of
the underlying trade-oﬀ between reducing travel cost and reaching
premium activity locations. Two types of learning are considered in the
model: learning from doing, and learning from information exchange. All
information exchanges in the model occur exclusively and locally at
nodes in the transportation systems, which is structurally appealing for
model development but does not directly capture global information
sharing (for example, through mass media). These and other minor




There are three types of agent in this agent-based travel demand model:
traveller, node, and arc. Each ‘traveller’ agent represents a road user in
the real world. A traveller is characterised by residential location, travel
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439budget (u), value of time (v), and perception threshold (T). The number of
travellers residing at each residential location is limited by the available
housing space at the location. Travel budget determines how far a traveller
is willing to travel for a speciﬁc activity, an important factor in destination
choice. Value of time provides travellers impetus to choose routes with
diﬀerent travel time and toll combinations. Perception threshold reﬂects
the individuals’ inertia to make behavioural changes, measured by expected
reductions in travel costs. These four traveller attributes are all ﬁxed and
drawn from predetermined distributions.
One of the two goals for each traveller is to ﬁnd an activity opportunity
that is located just far enough from the residential location such that the
travel budget is exhausted. The evidence that travellers maintain
commuting travel times, daily overall travel times, and generalised
commuting costs over time is well documented in the travel behaviour
literature (see Mokhtarian and Chen, 2004, for a review). It is conceivable
that travellers may have a threshold beyond which they will not travel. The
use of a travel budget in the proposed model is a simpliﬁcation of the travel-
lers’ underlying desire both to reduce travel cost and to reach premium
activity locations. The actual destination choice usually represents a
trade-oﬀ between travel cost and the quality of the activity location.
Since detailed information regarding the quality of destinations and of
how individuals evaluate destination quality is not readily available in
most areas, we use the travel budget to represent the consequence of this
underlying decision process. A traveller who cannot ﬁnd a satisfactory
destination within the travel budget forgoes the trip. The second traveller
goal is to identify the route to the chosen destination with the lowest
generalised cost. Travellers attempt to achieve this goal through learning-
by-doing during personal explorations and learning from information
exchanges with other travellers.
3.2.2 Node
In order to maintain a parsimonious model structure, each ‘node’ agent
represents three identities in the real world:
. a vertex of the physical road network where roads (arcs) are connected;
. a centroid where residents and activity opportunities are located;
. a place where travellers can exchange information and learn from each
other.
In reality, travellers learn destinations and routes from other travellers in
many diﬀerent ways. For instance, such information exchange can occur
in oﬃces, neighbourhood parks, restaurants, shopping centres, or through
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a reasonable approximation of the real-world information-sharing process
because the probability of travellers meeting increases with the overlap
between parts of the network that they cover in their trips.
Travellers clearly cannot remember all possible paths between origins
and destinations. Each node in the model therefore only stores the informa-
tion of the K shortest travel-time paths and K lowest-toll paths from every
other node to itself. This is necessary for users with diﬀerent values of time
to ﬁnd the paths with the lowest general travel cost. Information exchange
occurs when a traveller visits a node during the traveller’s destination and
route search process. The travellers can provide the updated shortest-path
information to nodes visited later. The node can deliver the updated
shortest-path information to subsequent visiting travellers. This distributed
learning mechanism does not guarantee the identiﬁcation of the true
shortest paths. However, it does reﬂect the limitation of real-world travel-
lers in route learning. Simulation results in this study show that travellers
are more likely to ﬁnd the true shortest paths if the network is smaller
(fewer alternative routes) and if the total number of travellers in the
network is larger (more learning opportunities).
3.2.3 Arc
An‘arc’ agentrepresentsa directionalroadwaysegment. Eacharcislabeled
with its origin node, destination node, capacity (F), free-ﬂow travel time
(t0), and toll rate (t), and ownership status (O). The congested arc travel
time (t) and generalised arc travel cost (c) can be derived from ﬂow–cost
functions. We adopt a simple representation of the supply-side of the trans-
portation network, and employ the standard BPR function. Although our
agent-based structure can readily accommodate a microsimulation dynamic
network supply model, we choose to focus in this paper on route assignment
with completely heterogeneous users that in itself represents a signiﬁcant
advance from existing traﬃc assignment procedures.
3.3 Behavioural rules and interactions
This subsection describes how aggregate demand patterns can be derived
fromthe behavioursof and interactionsamongthe threetypes of aforemen-
tioned agent. Given an initial residential location, each traveller examines
activity opportunities by exploring the surrounding nodes, starting from
the origin. The probability of moving to a speciﬁc node in each search
step is proportional to the amount of remaining activity opportunities
located at that node. During this initial exploration process, travellers
accumulate their network knowledge, a form of learning-by-doing. The
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number of travellers ensure a set of diversiﬁed initial route choices. In
addition, an avoidance mechanism in the model guarantees that travellers
do not visit the same node twice. This eliminates circular routes in the desti-
nation search, and also ensures that travellers will consider nodes further
away from the origins, albeit with a smaller probability. A traveller selects
a destination node once the personal travel budget is reached, or decides
not to travel at all if no destination node previously-visited satisﬁes the
travel budget. This initial destination choice algorithm is equivalent to a
stochastic microscopic implementation of the intervening opportunities
model (Stoufer, 1940; Haynes and Fotheringham, 1984) with a travel
budget. Due to congestion eﬀects and as learning continues, a traveller
may need to adjust the destination and/or route choices after the initial
destination and route are found.
When a traveller learns a new route, the traveller must determine
whether or not to switch to the new route. The two alternative paths are
evaluated based on the traveller’s value of time, perception threshold,




e ðs=bÞg T þ e 0:5g T if b > T;





where p is the probability of switching to the new route; b is the actual
beneﬁt of switching route measured in dollars; T is the traveller’s percep-
tion threshold measured in dollars; and g and s are the parameters deﬁning
the shape of the probability curve. A larger g implies that the probability
drops faster when the beneﬁt reduces; s is a scale parameter that deﬁnes
the overall tendency for travellers to switch routes.
When travellers switch routes, arc ﬂows and travel times are updated
according to the arc cost function. Consequently, the cost of all paths
stored at nodes and learned by travellers would also change, which may
trigger further route switching. A route choice equilibrium is achieved if
no traveller, given the information available and the ﬁxed value of time,
has incentives to change routes. This is similar to the ‘behavioral user
equilibrium’ concept in Zhang (2007). However, this model diﬀers from
Zhang (2007) in its implementation of route search and choice rules. If
travellers can no longer satisfy their travel budgets by changing routes
alone, they would then adjust their destination choices. When destination
changes are necessary, travellers investigate the nodes adjacent to their
current destinations in order to reduce their travel costs. A traveller may
need to change destinations more than once to satisfy the travel budget.
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trips because a satisfactory destination cannot be found, a destination-trip
frequency choice equilibrium is achieved.
The combined route–destination-trip frequency choice equilibrium can
be derived for a particular transportation network with the route choice
equilibrium and the destination-frequency choice equilibrium simulated
iteratively. The convergence can be measured by the maximum or average
origin–destination demand diﬀerence (or other typical network con-
vergence indicators) between consecutive simulation iterations. This ﬁnal
equilibrium represents the result of an implied game played by all travellers,
where they exhibit both cooperative and non-cooperative behaviours.
Travellers cooperate by sharing network information with each other.
However, they only consider their own beneﬁts when making individual
destination and routing decisions.
3.4 Model calibration
We derived a set of model parameters for the Sioux Falls network which
contains twenty-four nodes, seventy-six links, and 33,640 peak-hour trips
as seen in the previous traﬃc assignment literature (for example, LeBlanc,
1975). The travel budget distribution is calibrated against observed trip
length data. A log-normal distribution with a mean of 35.4min and a stan-
dard deviation of 13.4min is obtained from the calibration (see Figure 1).
In theory, a distribution for the value of time may be derived from stated or
Figure 1















Agent-Based Model of Price Competition Zhang, Levinson, and Zhu
443revealed preference survey data and mixed discrete choice models.
However, we do not have access to such data in the Sioux Falls area.
Based on the shape of typical income distributions and the general correla-
tion between income and value of time, we consider in the base scenario a
log-normal value-of-time distribution with both the mean and standard
deviation being US$15 per hour.
Coeﬃcients in the route-switching rule (equation (1)) and travellers’
perception thresholds inﬂuence the route choice equilibrium in the agent-
based model. Since the Sioux Falls network is a relatively small network,
travellers should be able to identify the shortest paths even when the
network is congested. We therefore calibrate the route choice coeﬃcients
against a standard user equilibrium traﬃc assignment pattern by enforcing
uniform values of time for all travellers in the agent-based model. The ﬁnal
calibrated coeﬃcients are g ¼ 1, T ¼ $0:10, and s ¼ 2. The mean
(maximum) link ﬂow diﬀerence between the agent-based model and the
user equilibrium model is 2.4 percent (6.4 per cent) under this set of
route choice coeﬃcients.
4.0 The Agent-Based Model: Price and Capacity Choices
In response to user choices, road operators determine whether or not to
charge tolls, set the appropriate toll levels, and make capacity investment
decisions. A pubic road agent is assumed to maximise social welfare
given applicable political constraints. A private road agent maximises
proﬁts, given applicable regulatory constraints.
4.1 Public roads
Users of existing public roads pay for fuel taxes, vehicle sales and registra-
tion taxes, and driver’s license fees, and in some areas, general taxes for
travel. These taxes produce an equivalent toll of around 2.5 cents per
kilometre under the following conditions:
. 8.5 kilometres per litre average vehicle fuel eﬃciency;
. 10.5 cents per litre combined federal and state fuel taxes;
. fuel taxes constitute half of the total road preservation, maintenance,
and improvement funds (this percentage is roughly consistent with
the current road ﬁnancing practices in the USA).
The current prevailing tax rate, instead of the socially optimal one, is
adopted for the analysis. It should also be noted that users of private toll
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double charges on private road users.
The public authority allocates the pooled tax revenues and allows
cross-subsidisation among public roads. Empirical evidence shows that
public road authorities employ ranking systems to prioritise preservation,
maintenance, and capacity investment projects (Montes de Oca and
Levinson, 2006). The ranking systems are often based on a higher-level
allocation of funds between diﬀerent types of expenditure, lower-level
project scores rated by an expert panel, and possibly some formula-based
mechanism that considers geographic equity. In the USA, public-road
authorities give priority to road preservation and maintenance activities,
and allocate the remaining funds for capacity expansion. We assume in
the model that revenue generated from road users is appropriated to ﬁrst
defray road maintenance costs. The remaining revenue, if any, will then
be allocated to capacity expansion projects with the highest beneﬁt–cost
ratios until revenue exhaustion. The method for computing the beneﬁt–
cost ratios of expanding each road in the network is the same as that in
Zhang and Levinson (2005). Two Cobb–Douglas functions are estimated
in previous studies for capacity expansion and road-maintenance costs
respectively (Levinson and Karamalaputi, 2003; Zhang and Levinson,
2005), and adopted herein:





















In the cost functions, a is the index of roads and i is the index of time
periods. Kilometres of roadway construction (l), additional capacity
added (F
iþ1   F
i), existing road capacity (F
i), and technology factors
(f, m) are variables. It has been shown that road-construction cost depends
on the length of the roadway, current roadway type (for example, freeway,
arterial streets that can be captured by the existing level of road capacity),
and the amount of capacity expansion (Levinson and Karamalaputi, 2003).
Empirical evidence on maintenance cost functions at the link level is an
understudied area in transportation economics. In theory, it should
depend on the length of the road, the type of the road, and possibly on
traﬃc volumes, as is corroborated by Paterson and Archondo-Callao
(1991) and recognised by the USA FHWA Highway Economic Require-
ment System (HERS).
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Previous economic analysis of private roads often makes strong assumptions
about the availability and reliability of the demand information, and
addresses the problems of proﬁt-maximising toll and capacity on stylised
networks by mathematical programming techniques. In contrast, we derive
the price and capacity choices of private roads by examining the information
actually available to private roads and by allowing private roads to adjust
their decisions over time as more information becomes available.
Cooperation between private roads are assumed away, and each private
road is only interested in its own proﬁt in our analysis. Private roads maxi-
mise short-term proﬁts by setting the appropriate tolls given the current
capacity levels. The proﬁt-maximising toll depends on travellers’ demand
elasticities with respect to tolls, which depend on all substitutional and
complementary eﬀects in the network. To estimate accurately the
demand elasticities on private roads for the current and future years on
complex networks is diﬃcult, due to intrinsic demand uncertainties,
network complexity, and data availability for forecasting. Under these
circumstances, private roads can better achieve their proﬁt objectives by
learning demand responses adaptively as they accumulate information on
historical tolls, the resulting traﬃc ﬂows, and proﬁt levels. It is therefore
assumed in the model that private roads employ price (toll) and quantity
(ﬂow) information in the previous time periods to estimate the underlying
demand curves using line-ﬁtting techniques. Simulation results in Zhang
and Levinson (2005) show that the demand curves on toll roads are
approximately linear when the majority of the roads on a grid network
are untolled, and closely resemble power functions when toll roads are in
the majority. However, to what extent their ﬁndings are applicable to
general networks should be tested empirically in future research.
The following describes the detailed procedure for setting private road
tolls. First, a rolling-horizon toll-proﬁt function is empirically derived
based on historical toll and proﬁt information. The underlying demand
curve on any private roads may shift due to toll adjustments and capacity
expansions on other roads. Therefore, an intelligent private road should
routinely update the toll-proﬁt function to maximise proﬁt. At each
decision point, if the most recent toll-proﬁt parabola has a maximal
proﬁt point (reverse U shape), the corresponding proﬁt-maximising toll
can be directly identiﬁed. If a maximal proﬁt point does not exist on the
parabola (U shape), the private roads should reduce or increase their
current toll by a certain amount (assumed to be 50 per cent; reducing the
toll if the current toll is on the left-hand side of the U curve, and increasing
the toll if on the right-hand side). A real-world example of this type of
adaptive toll-adjustment process is available. When the private Dulles
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US$1.75 per vehicle based on the demand estimates at the time, later
reduced to US$1.00, owing to lower-than-expected levels of travel
demand (an anonymous reviewer points out that this is primarily due to
a downturn in the economy, leading to slower land development along
the corridor). The toll was increased again in 1997 to US$1.15 to improve
proﬁt, followed by yet another toll increase in 2004 (FHWA 2006).
A private road expands its capacity when the additional capacity invest-
ment promises an investment return higher thanthat of all other investment
opportunities available to the private investor (r0, assumed to be 6 per cent
annually). The life-cycle cost of capacity expansion can be computed from
equation (2) and a standard discounting process. However, the expected
long-term investment return or proﬁt cannot be estimated with much
certainty as other roads in the network may also expand capacity and
change tolls, therefore shifting future demand curves for the private road
currently considering capacity expansion. We develop the following heur-
istic procedure for any private road to make capacity investment decisions
under uncertainty:
Step 1 Assume that the capacity and tolls on all other roads will remain
unchanged throughout the thirty-year planning horizon; this implies that
the current demand elasticity will hold in the future.
Step 2 Compute travel-time savings for users of the particular private
road that can result from a speciﬁc feasible amount of capacity expansion
K (adding one more lane, or two more lanes, and so on).
Step 3 Convert the travel-time savings onthe private roadfollowing capa-
city expansion to a monetary value (p-time) based on the weighted
average value of time of all travellers currently using the private road.
Step 4 Increase the toll on the private road by t such that the total
number of users on the private road remains unchanged.
Step 5 Compute the annual additional proﬁt gain throughout the plan-
ning horizon resulting from the increased toll on the link (p-toll).
Step 6 Let p ¼ maximum (p-time, p-toll), which is the estimated
total proﬁt from the additional capacity.
Step 7 Compute the annual return of capacity investment for the current
capacity expansion scenario. Let the maximum annual return of all possible
capacity investment scenarios be r
  and the corresponding capacity addi-
tion be K
 .
Step 8 The private road expands capacity by K
  if r
  > r0; otherwise,
there is no capacity expansion.
This heuristic provides a conservative estimate of the return on capacity
investment because it only considers proﬁt gains for private roads in two
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(p-time), and the proﬁt from increased toll only with higher levels of
service (p-toll).
The agent-based model of user, price, and capacity choices is now
completely developed and ready for the subsequent analysis on product
diﬀerentiation. It is important to recognise that these choices are made
on dissimilar timescales by various decision-makers. In this paper, we
assume that capacity expansion and pricing decisions are made once
every year (or once in each simulated time period) by both public and
private roads, which corresponds to the current ﬁscal-year and regulatory
practices. Road users in the model can adjust their trip frequencies, destina-
tions, and route choices multiple times in each year, but an overall travel
demand equilibrium is reached once a year following annual price and
capacity changes.
5.0 Product Diﬀerentiation on Congested Networks
The agent-based model is applicable to a variety of network economic
analyses on complex networks with heterogeneous users, including alterna-
tive road-pricing schemes, investment policies, and ownership structures.
The analysis and simulation results presented in this section both demon-
strate the agent-based approach, and explore the evolution and impact of
product diﬀerentiation on congested networks.
We create a mixed-ownership network by adding a parallel private toll
road to each of the untolled seventy-six public roads in the Sioux-Falls
network. The resulting test network has twenty-four nodes and 152 arcs.
The total number of desired daily trips is 336,400, although certain trips
may be cancelled due to unsuccessful destination searches. The agent-
based model simulates only one peak hour per day. The hourly statistics
are then converted into daily and annual statistics. The base-case network
is heavily congested, as the average volume-to-capacity ratio under the
assumption of no tolls on all roads is 1.41.
5.1 Deﬁnitions and measures of product diﬀerentiation
There are two levels of product diﬀerentiation: product diﬀerentiation of
routes (path diﬀerentiation), and product diﬀerentiation of destinations
(space diﬀerentiation). Path diﬀerentiation occurs when certain routes
between origins and destinations are reserved for a speciﬁc group of
users due to high (low) prices and good (poor) levels of service. When all
routes reaching a particular destination can be aﬀorded by only a speciﬁc
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particular user group, which results in an extreme case of space diﬀerentia-
tion. In the present agent-based model, users are diﬀerentiated by their
valueof time (orbyincome). We useincomeand value-of-timeinterchange-
ably in the following discussion, recognising that these two characteristics
are not perfectly correlated. It is also possible to label users in the model
with other socioeconomic or demographic characteristics such as age,
gender, and ethnicity.
In order to measure path diﬀerentiation, let us consider all users (q)
between a particular OD pair. When a standard user equilibrium deter-
mines the route assignment and travel time is the only route attribute, all
q users should experience exactly the same travel time, and pay zero toll.
The level of path diﬀerentiation should be zero numerically in this case.
However, when toll roads are present in the network, users with higher
values of time are more likely to use the toll roads that operate at lower
levels of congestion than their untolled counterparts. We propose two
measures of these price and level-of-service diﬀerences to assess the level
of path diﬀerentiation. The Gini coeﬃcient of concentration (Gini, 1936)
has been used by economists to analyse income inequality. A Gini coeﬃ-
cient of zero indicates perfect equality (the case of standard user equili-
brium with no tolls), and one indicates perfect inequality (a single user
suﬀers all the delays, or a single user pays all the tolls). It can be calculated
as the ‘relative mean diﬀerence’; that is, the mean of the travel time (toll)
























where Gt is the Gini coeﬃcient of travel time inequality (Time Gini); Gt is
the Gini coeﬃcient of toll inequality (Toll Gini); t is the travel time; t is the
toll, and m, n are indices of users between the OD pair.
The second measure of path diﬀerentiation requires the division of all
users between an OD pair into several groups by value of time (VOT).
We identify three VOT groups in this paper: high, medium, and low. The
ratio of the average travel time of the high-VOT group to that of the
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449low-VOT group (Rt) reveals the degree to which roads with higher levels of
service are reserved for the high-VOT group. Similarly, the ratio of the
average toll paid by the low-VOT group to that paid by the high-VOT
group (Rt) is also a good measure of path diﬀerentiation. Both ratios
should be between zero and one, with zero implying maximum path diﬀer-
entiation, and one meaning no path diﬀerentiation. Unfortunately, this is
just the opposite of the Gini coeﬃcient. In order to minimise confusion,
we use (1   Rt) and (1   Rt) as the second group of measures of path diﬀer-
entiation. For the remainder of the paper, (1   Rt) will be referred to as the
Time Ratio, and (1   Rt) the Toll Ratio. In order to aggregate OD-level
path diﬀerentiation measures to a network-wide measure, we employ the
weighted average of the OD-level measures with the OD ﬂows being the
weights.
Space diﬀerentiation at a destination may be computed as the weighted
mean of path diﬀerentiation from all origins. A more intuitive method is
directly to examine the distribution of values of time among all users
arriving at that destination. For instance, a destination may only serve
users with high values of time because all paths reaching the destination
are heavily tolled. In this sense, toll roads can potentially exacerbate the
level of urban segregation by values of time. We measure the level of












where Gs is the Gini coeﬃcient of space diﬀerentiation (Space Gini); VOT is
the value of time; Q is the total number of users arriving at the destination;
and m, n are the indices of users arriving at the destination.
5.2 Welfare measures
Measuring annual producers’ surplus on congested networks is relatively
straightforward, being the total annual revenue minus the amortised
construction and maintenance costs. When there is a single origin–destina-
tion pair on the network, the area underneath the ﬁxed OD demand curve
and above the line representing the actual price paid provides a measure of
the consumers’ surplus. However, when there exist multiple interdependent
OD pairs on a complex network, a good measure of consumer’s surplus is
less obvious. Total travel time savings on the network does not represent
the full user beneﬁts because travel-time savings (and cost reductions) on
the network can result in longer trips to more attractive destinations and
Journal of Transport Economics and Policy Volume 42, Part 3




































where CSi is the consumers’ surplus of user group i (high, medium, and
low-income groups); y is the index of simulation periods; v is the index of
OD pairs; V is the total number of OD pairs in the network; p
y
i;v is the
average generalised cost paid by users in group i with OD pair v; q
y
i;v is
the total number of users in group i with OD pair v; j is the index of
users in group i with OD pair v; t is the travel time; t is the toll; and
VOTj is the value of time of user j.
This measure of consumers’ surplus is clearly sensitive to travel-time
savings and toll reductions. It is also sensitive to destination choices and
travel distances because the selection of a new destination by a user
causes q to decrease by one for the old OD pair, and to increase by one
for the new OD pair; that is, although each traveller in our model has a
ﬁxed travel budget, a destination change would still register a change in
consumers’ surplus according to equation (4). The consumer welfare
measured deﬁned in equation (4) implies ﬁxed demand curves for all OD
pairs, guaranteed by the ﬁxed land-use assumption in this paper. However,
when applied to scenarios with variable land use, this measure may produce
biased welfare estimates. Further research may also develop more sophisti-
cated measures of user beneﬁts on complex networks that better account
for welfare changes associated with the quality of destinations. Measures
not considering destination quality tend to underestimate the welfare
gains resulting from transportation investment.
5.3 Base-case results
Both price and capacity competition is allowed between public and private
roads in the based case. System dynamics are simulated over 100 iterations
for the network to reach a stable pattern (see Figure 2). The private sector
reacts to the user demand for more road capacity and improved level of
service much faster than the public sector, as seen by the sharp increase
of total lane-kilometres of private roads in early iterations. It should be
noted that the above ﬁnding is under the assumption that the public
sector does not borrow from either the private sector or other revenue
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451sources to improve public roads. In the real world, government agencies
may borrow money and ﬁnance much-needed new transportation facilities
through various kinds of bond that are paid back by future revenue
streams. The model results also show that private roads can learn the
demand elasticities over time and gradually increase the toll to the
maximum level of US$0.35 per kilometre. Eventually, public roads are
able to expand their capacity with available funding to the point when
the total tax revenue just defrays the total maintenance cost. Over time,
capacity expansions on public roads force private roads to reduce their
tolls to about US$0.17 per kilometre at the long-run network equilibrium.
Lower privatetolls then lead to capacity reductions on certain private roads
(152 lane-kilometre, to be exact) because their annual toll revenues fall
short of annual maintenance costs.
Figure 3 plots the level of production diﬀerentiation with measures
developed in Section 5.1. It is evident that toll-related measures of path
diﬀerentiation (Toll Gini and Toll Ratio) are much higher than time-related
measures (Time Gini and Time Ratio). This indicates that toll-road users
accept a large premium of toll charges in exchange for a disproportionately
small reduction in travel time. For example, at the long-run network
equilibrium, the high-income group on average pays about four times
(Toll Ratio¼0.75) more than the low-income group for just a 19 per
cent reduction in travel time (Time Ratio¼0.19). All four measures of
Figure 2
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452path diﬀerentiation provide consistent results, and therefore could be used
interchangeably on this test network for policy comparison purposes. The
proﬁles of the path diﬀerentiation measures closely resemble the proﬁle of
private tolls in Figure 2, which is expected. Interestingly, the level of space
diﬀerentiation increases monotonically without displaying a decreasing
trend following the toll reductions. This suggests that once a destination
has been established as primarily serving high- or low-income groups,
that status is unlikely to be changed by a small toll reduction. Nevertheless,
toll roads clearly have increased space diﬀerentiation on the test network.
In other words, by making certain destinations more or less amenable to
speciﬁc income groups, road pricing could exacerbate urban segregation
by income.
In the base case, all income groups have beneﬁted from the increased
level of product diﬀerentiation due to price and capacity competition (see
Figure 4). Not surprisingly, the high-income group reaps the majority of
consumer beneﬁts, while the low-income group barely experiences a
positive change. Since the three income groups are divided into equal
shares of the total population, the above ﬁnding also holds on a per
capita basis. The overall net social beneﬁt is quite stable, following the
quick capacity expansion on private roads in the ﬁrst several iterations.
However, a redistribution of welfare gains between private roads and
users is obvious during the simulation period. The driving force of this
Figure 3
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453welfare redistribution is the slow but steady capacity expansion on public
roads. However, this redistribution regarded as favourable by public
policy makers comes at a signiﬁcant cost of $2.85 billion including
construction and maintenance costs. This cost may be avoided with
proper regulation on the pricing and/or capacity investment decisions of
private roads. Although the agent-based model can be readily applied to
regulatory analysis, we leave that for future research to keep the focus on
product diﬀerentiation.
The agent-based structure of the network economics model allows one
to track the decision-making process and status of each user and each
road authority, which provides certain system statistics that are not
available from traditional equilibrium analysis. These statistics could be
important for various ﬁnancial and policy analysis tasks. Figure 5 provides
two examples: the total number of users priced oﬀ the network, and the
percentage of proﬁtable private roads. The ﬁrst statistic is valuable for
the equity considerations of network ﬁnancing policies. The second statistic
can provide important inputs to the investment decisions of private roads
(and toll roads in general), and the analysis of optimal regulation. Nearly
40 per cent of the private roads will not be proﬁtable at the equilibrium.
This is due to the overinvestment period at the beginning of the simulation,
triggered by both true demand for new road facilities and the ignorance of
Figure 4
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454the collective inﬂuence of competitors’ investment decisions (similar to a
stock-market or housing-market bubble). The model assumes that every
private road has to maintain a minimum level of road capacity to sustain
network connectivity. In reality, private road authorities that lose money
will most probably abandon or sell the roads unless certain regulatory
restrictions exist.
5.4 Variations on two themes
Various parameters in the base case could be allowed to vary, which would
produce a large number of test scenarios for various policy analysis tasks.
We choose to alter the base case on two themes:
. the type of competition allowed;
. the degree of user heterogeneity.
5.4.1 Diﬀerent types of competition
The base case incorporates both price and capacity competition. We create
two additional scenarios with only one of the two types of competition
allowed respectively (see Table 1). When capacity expansion is prohibited,
public roads have practically no instrument to compete with private toll
roads because they do not have freedom to adjust prices either. Therefore,
private roads are able to impose on users a heavy toll as high as US$1.02
Figure 5
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455per kilometre. The level of product diﬀerentiation is astoundingly high in
this scenario with price competition only. According to the time (0.37)
and toll ratios (0.94), toll-road users pay seventeen times more than users
of untolled roads to save only 37 per cent of travel time. Clearly, only a
very small portion of the users with very high incomes are willing to use
the toll roads, while others are either priced oﬀ the toll roads, or oﬀ the
network entirely. It is interesting to note that the medium-income group
takes the hardest hit, although all three income groups are hurt by the
high tolls. Some high-income users could beneﬁt from the over-priced toll
roads as shown by their willingness to pay. Many low-income users have
marginal welfare gains from their trips initially, and they can minimise
their losses due to high tolls or heavy congestion simply by cancelling
their trips. Consequently, the medium-income group does not have the
most to lose, but loses the most. Verhoef and Small (2004) have found
similar unfavourable results for medium-income travellers in a pay-lane
network when a second-best pricing scheme is imposed.
The next scenario under the theme of competition types only allows
capacity competition, and enforces ﬁxed prices on both private (US$0.17
per kilometre, same as the average toll in the base case) and public
roads (US$0.025 per kilometre). The welfare measures with only capacity
competition are almost identical to the base case, indicating that in the
base case a larger share of potential beneﬁts are to be reaped from capacity
changes as opposed to pricing. This also suggests that properly restricting
Table 1









Average private road toll (US$/km) 0.17 1.02 0.17 (ﬁxed)
Lane-km of private roads 1,085 605 (ﬁxed) 994
Lane-km of public roads 1,178 605 (ﬁxed) 989
Path diﬀerentiation: Time Gini 0.04 0.11 0.03
Path diﬀerentiation: Toll Gini 0.32 0.45 0.26
Path diﬀerentiation: Time Ratio 0.18 0.37 0.13
Path diﬀerentiation: Toll Ratio 0.78 0.94 0.61
Space diﬀerentiation: Space Gini 0.17 0.25 0.16
Private road proﬁt (million US$) 73 480 65
Consumers’ surplus: high income 381  67 389
Consumers’ surplus: medium income 197  127 203
Consumers’ surplus: low income 15  39 16
Net social beneﬁt 666 247 673
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456the pricing freedom of toll roads has minimum impact on both the overall
net social beneﬁt and the distribution of welfare gains. This ﬁnding
supports road authorities to adopt simple and transparent tolling policies,
such as network-wideﬂat distance-based tolls. Implementingﬂat tolls could
be a practical way to limit economically ineﬃcient price competition on a
road network with competing toll roads. With ﬁxed toll rates, the same
level of net social beneﬁt can actually be achieved with less overall capacity
expansion than the base case. The level of path and space diﬀerentiation is
also lower with ﬁxed prices.
5.4.2 Diﬀerent levels of user heterogeneity
Previous studies on small single-OD networks have discovered the
important role of user heterogeneity in the welfare analysis of toll roads
(Arnott et al., 1992; de Palma, 1992; Schmanske, 1993; Small and Yan,
2001; Verhoef and Small, 2004; Xin and Levinson, 2006). The base case
assumes the mean and the standard deviation of the log-normal value-of-
time distribution to be both US$15 per hour. Four additional scenarios
are obtained with the standard deviation ranging from US$0 to US$30
per hour in Table 2. As the degree of user heterogeneity increases, we can
observe that:
1. Private roads charge higher tolls because the high-income users are
willing to pay more for the same level of service.
2. The high-income group enjoys increased consumers’ surplus.
Table 2
Network Statistics with Diﬀerent Degrees of User Heterogeneity
VOT Standard deviation (US$/hr)
0 7.5 15 22.5 30
Statistics
Average private road toll (US$/km) 0.16 0.16 0.17 0.25 0.29
Lane-km of private roads 1,226 1,158 1,085 1,062 1,125
Lane-km of public roads 1,184 1,178 1,178 1,174 1,068
Path diﬀerentiation: Time Gini 0 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.06
Path diﬀerentiation: Toll Gini 0 0.24 0.32 0.37 0.51
Path diﬀerentiation: Time Ratio 0 0.15 0.18 0.13 0.25
Path diﬀerentiation: Toll Ratio 0 0.65 0.78 0.79 0.86
Space diﬀerentiation: Space Gini 0 0.15 0.17 0.20 0.27
Private road proﬁt (million US$) 71 74 73 99 140
Consumers’ surplus: high income 257 341 381 483 557
Consumers’ surplus: medium income 257 262 197 168 190
Consumers’ surplus: low income 257 111 15 4  1
Net social beneﬁt 842 788 666 754 887
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4573. The low-income group sees consumers’ surplus decreased and will
eventually suﬀer welfare losses.
Changes in the level of user heterogeneity appear to have insigniﬁcant
inﬂuence on the capacity expansion decisions by either private or public
road authorities. In general, higher levels of product diﬀerentiation are
observed with higher degrees of user heterogeneity; but this trend does
not always hold (note the Time Gini and Time Ratio measures). When
the total net social beneﬁt is examined, a ‘worst’ value-of-time distribution
from the welfare perspective exists (Mean¼Std. Dev.¼US$15 per hour).
The lack of monotonicity (and therefore predictability) in welfare changes
suggests that knowledge of the actual VOT distribution critical in the
design and the full-impact analysis of toll road policies. This lack of mono-
tonicity in welfare changes can have structural reasons. When there is no
variation in VOT (this implies homogeneous users), private roads have to
build a great deal of capacity and charge relatively low tolls to compete
with public roads. Users clearly beneﬁt from this type of competition.
When VOT variations are present in the system, the product diﬀerentiation
process will discriminate against those with low VOT and beneﬁt those with
high VOT. If the level of VOT variation is relatively low, the additional
beneﬁt for the high-VOT users may not be suﬃcient to recover the loss
endured by the low-VOT users. This can lead to a net loss in total welfare.
However, if the level of VOT variation is very high, the beneﬁt for high-
VOT users exceeds the absolute loss for low-VOT users, leading to
increased social welfare.
6.0 Conclusions
This paper develops a novel and completely agent-based approach for
network economics analysis, and applies this approach to analyse price
competition, capacity choice, and product diﬀerentiation on congested
networks. This evolutionary paradigm complements the existing network
equilibrium methods, and brings several important advantages. First, the
decision-making process, behavioural adjustments, and actual experience
of each user and each supplier can be tracked in the agent-based approach,
which makes it especially capable of analysing the distributional eﬀects of
network management and ﬁnancing policies. Considering user heterogeneity
is also straightforward in the evolutionary approach. Second, the agent-
based approach is applicable to large real-world networks. Analysts can
use this tool to design and evaluate policy scenarios with consideration
of the comprehensive spatial and temporal eﬀects of these policies.
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458Product diﬀerentiation is inevitable in the presence of price and/or
capacity competition, as seen in the airline, rail, transit industries, and
increasingly, on road networks. This research deﬁnes two types of product
diﬀerentiation for networks: path diﬀerentiation and space diﬀerentiation,
and develops several practical measures. Results show that price competi-
tion is a more signiﬁcant source of product diﬀerentiation than capacity
competition. When toll roads seek maximum revenues, users with higher
values of time could pay much higher tolls than those with lower values
of time for a disproportionately small amount of time savings. While in
most cases users with the lowest values of time harvest the least beneﬁt
(or suﬀer the most loss) from road pricing and investment decisions,
users with the medium values of time can take the hardest hit in some
cases. Not surprisingly, users with the highest values of time always beneﬁt
the most from product diﬀerentiation in all tested scenarios.
Another ﬁnding is that the relationship between net social beneﬁt and
user heterogeneity is not monotonic on a complex network with tolled
and untolled roads. There exists a socially least optimal level of user
heterogeneity that corresponds to the lowest level of total social welfare.
Higher degrees of user heterogeneity do not always result in higher social
beneﬁts of toll roads. It is therefore important to collect information on
the actual distribution of users’ values of time for the welfare analysis of
private or public toll roads.
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